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We construct a new measure of financial development, through multivariate analysis, which includes 
several indicators of financial size and efficiency for 134 countries. Based on this broad measure, we 
assess empirically the determinants of financial development focusing on two factors not yet explored 
in the literature, namely the central bank role and bank regulation and supervision; and we explore the 
differences between emerging and industrial countries. The results show that a relatively large 
involvement of the central bank in the financial system contributes to financial development in all 
countries, other things given. In the industrial country group, both broader central bank objectives and 
a large LOLR mandate are found to be beneficial. For emerging countries, the central bank 
involvement in the payment system, as well as broader central bank objectives, seem to enhance 
financial development. Finally, high quality regulation and supervision, particularly supervisory 
independence, is beneficial in industrial countries. As for emerging ones, supervisory independence 
only contributes to financial development if a relatively solid institutional framework is in place 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The renewed interest on the financial system reflects the view that its development helps countries 
achieve higher economic growth. In the last few years, the economic literature has made enormous 
progress in understanding the channels through which financial development fosters economic 
growth. However, large differences still exist on what is meant by financial development, because of 
the different dimensions that such concept can have (size, efficiency, etc) and the number of segments 
it may include (banking system, bond and stock markets, etc). While difficult to summarize all the 
information in a single indicator of financial development, it would nonetheless be useful for 
policymakers. This would allow them to take the measures fostering the financial system as a whole, 
and not specific sectors or aspects of it, perhaps in detriment of others. The first objective of the paper 
is, thus, to construct a comprehensive indicator of financial development, which  includes all these 
different aspects. 
 
In the same vein, there is still no single model of financial development, in terms of a widely accepted 
set of factors which contribute to it. This is particularly the case for institutional variables, due to the 
scarcity of underlying models formalizing the potential linkages between them and financial 
development, and the lack of data. Among the institutional factors which may influence the 
development of the financial sector, there are two which are potentially relevant but have hardly 
received any attention. One is the central bank, and the other is financial regulation and supervision. It 
can be easily argued that the central bank is the most important institution for the financial system, 
particularly if it is bank-based. Banks are largely affected by the way in which the central bank reacts 
not only when conducting monetary policy, but also when acting as lender of last resort, or when 
performing payments system functions; and this may be influenced by the objectives the central bank 
is to achieve. In addition, the way in which  financial regulation and supervision is conducted is of 
crucial importance for financial institutions since they need to comply with that regulatory 
environment. The second objective of the paper is, thus, to assess empirically the role of these two 
institutional factors in fostering financial development.   
 
The paper is organized as follows: After this short introduction, Section 2 reviews the existing 
literature on the definitions of financial development and its determinants, with particular attention to 
the role of the central bank and financial regulation and supervision. Section 3 sets out the objective 
of the paper. Section 4 describes the variables and data chosen. Section 5 presents the methodology 
used to construct this new definition of financial development and that of the regression analysis, as 
well as some stylized facts on the relation with the objective and the dependent variables. Section 6 
describes the results and Section 7 draws some final conclusions. 
 
2. THE DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND ITS DETERMINANTS: A 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
Financial development is a concept with several dimensions, some of which reflect the size of the 
financial system, and others its efficiency in intermediating funds. The literature has dealt with the 
former at length, and less so with the latter. 
 
The size of the financial system can be measured in many different ways: the amount of funds it 
intermediates and processes, the number and range of firms and services it provides, and/or the 
economic resources it employs (World Bank 2001a). Existing definitions focus primarily on size, and 
have evolved from narrow to broader measures, as the variety of financial instruments and markets 
has increased. Among the narrowest definitions, the most widely used indicator for many years has 
been liquid liabilities (or M2) to GDP (McKinnon 1973).  Another very commonly used definition of 
financial size and, to some extent, efficiency is the ratio of credit granted by the banking system to the   3 
private sector relative to GDP (Levine and Zervos 1998, Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1999,)
1.  In the 
same vein, the ratio of commercial bank to central bank assets measures to what extent funds are 
allocated productively, particularly in those emerging countries where the central bank is still a major 
player in the allocation of resources (King and Levine, 1993). Wider measures of financial size 
include the domestic capital markets (i.e. domestic bond issuance and stock market capitalization, 
Rajan and Zingales 1998). Although broad, the latter measure still misses some of the sources of 
financing, as inter-company financing
2, international financing (through interbank loans or bonds) and 
the informal financial sector
3, but such data is not readily available for a large number of countries. 
 
There is no single indicator of financial efficiency that can be applied to all markets. For the banking 
sector, the most widely used indicators are the net interest margin and the bank overhead cost, defined 
as the ratio of overhead costs to total assets (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999), and none of the two 
are perfect. The net interest margin is generally associated with tighter margins from greater 
competition, but also with low interest rates in developed countries, or macroeconomic volatility in 
emerging ones. Another more readily available indicator of bank efficiency is the inverse of the 
spread between banks’ lending and deposit interest rates. Capital market efficiency is usually defined 
in terms of how much information is reflected in the prices of financial instruments (Fama and 
Sharpe, 1970). Ultimately, capital market efficiency depends on the depth, breadth and resilience of 
markets, which is very much related to their liquidity. The most frequently used measure of liquidity 
is the turnover,  which gives the value of stock transactions relative to the size of the market 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1996).  In addition, the total value traded relative to GDP is also 
frequently used as a measure of market liquidity (Levine and Zervos, 1998), together with the bid-ask 
spreads. An additional variable may be the number of listed companies, which indicates the extent to 
which enterprises raise funds on the stock exchange (through IPOs).  
 
As for the determinants of financial development, the literature has devoted most of the attention to 
macroeconomic and financial-system related ones, and much less so to institutional factors. However, 
institutions are key for the effective functioning of the financial system and its development since they 
affect their “infrastructure” and the environment in which they operate (World Bank, 2001a). 
 
Among the many possibly relevant institutional factors, we consider two sets of particular importance, 
even if they have hardly received any attention. The first is the central bank, and the second financial 
regulation and supervision. While there is growing literature on the role of the central bank in macro-
prudential stability
4, much less is known about its impact on the development of the financial system, 
other than indirectly by guarding price stability
5. Among the central bank responsibilities, its 
involvement in the payments system appears as a key function for the functioning of the financial 
system in which the central bank should play a role (Sheppard 1996). For instance, the oversight 
function is widely accepted (BIS 2001) but not so much the direct operation of the payment system. 
Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) opine that the private sector can run the payment system, without 
any interference by the central bank, as long as it can obtain sufficient information with real-time 
monitoring to oversee financial institutions. In contrast, Summers (1991) argues in favor of an active 
role for the central bank in operating large value in payments system, because of the systemic risk 
involved, so that a safety net exists in case of malfunctioning of the system.   
                         
1 There is another interesting twist to private credit: while its level reflects financial depth, its too rapid growth 
might be interpreted quite differently, being one of the most reliable indicators of financial crises in the 
empirical literature (McKinnon and Pill, 1997, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
2 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) find that firms tend to act more as providers of credit to their 
customers when the banking system is large and efficient and has a small proportion of public ownership of the 
banking system.  
3 Informal finance is very important in many regions and, for certain groups, in almost all regions of the 
developing world (Besley, 1995). 
4 García-Herrero (2002) assesses empirically the impact of the institutional setting of the central bank on bank 
unsoundness. 
5 As will be mentioned later, price stability has been found to be beneficial for the development of the financial 
system.   4 
The LOLR functions have also been analyzed mainly from a financial stability perspective, and not 
from a financial development one. Bagehot’s basic principles are considered the benchmark for the 
LOLR functions that a central bank should have, namely that only solvent (although illiquid) 
institutions should have the right to receive funds. From  that benchmark, the free-market school 
(Humphrey, 1975) argues that the importance of the LOLR is limited today by the development of the 
banking system, which allows illiquid banks to find funds without resorting to the central bank. At the 
other end of the spectrum, a relatively more interventionist school (De Cecco, 1999; He, 2000; and 
Das and Quintyn, 2002) advocates for temporary central bank assistance even to insolvent -but 
systemic- banks on the basis that it is impossible, in practice, to distinguish between insolvency and 
illiquidity in a short period of time.  
 
The central bank objectives and, in particular, how broadly they are set, have received attention as a 
useful tool to achieve price stability (Cukierman, 1992) but less so for financial stability
6.  The latter 
is, ultimately, a question of whether synergies or trade-offs exist between price and financial stability, 
and thereby, financial development  
 
As regards financial regulation and supervision, the literature has focused on its impact o n the 
occurrence of crisis events. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001b) show that good quality regulation and 
supervision reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis. More recently, Quintyn and Taylor (2002) have 
focused on the independence of supervisors, arguing that it is key for financial stability for the same 




Finally, the involvement of the central bank in financial regulation and supervision, as opposed to 
a separate agency, has attracted considerable attention - but no consensus - as several countries have 
decided to move this responsibility outside the central bank. However, the focus of the analysis has 
not been the development of the financial system but rather the achievement of price or financial 
stability.  
 
We now review briefly which factors have been found to contribute to financial development, so as to 
shape the control variables for our empirical analysis. Among the institutional factors, the quality of 
the legal system seems key (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1999), as well as more specific issues such as 
creditors’ rights (Levine, Loayza and Beck, 1999; Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff, 1999)
8. As for 
the role of the deposit insurance scheme (DIS), the evidence is mixed: Cull et al. (2000) consider it 
positive as long as it is explicit and limited and the institutional and regulatory environment is sound. 
 
Among the factors related to the financial system, a balanced financial structure (defined as the 
weight that the banking system should have relative to the capital markets) is generally regarded 
superior since one segment can act as “spare tire” when the other gets in trouble (Greenspan, 1999) 
but no clear empirical result supports this thesis
9. A relatively large share of foreign participation is 
generally considered beneficial on the grounds that it brings fresh capital into the banking system 
(Kroszner, 1998) and better management (Crystal et al., 2001) although there are also claims that 
foreign financial institutions can facilitate capital flight or limit the amount of credit granted. Public 
ownership has been associated, except for some isolated cases of success, with weaker financial 
systems as well as lower economic growth and p roductivity (La Porta et al., 2000) although the 
                         
6 García Herrero and Pedro del Río (2003) find empirical evidence that having central banks which narrowly 
focus on price stability fosters financial stability. 
7 Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) find no strong connection between a large number of official supervisory 
indicators and bank performance and stability. 
8 Creditor rights include the possibility to repossess collateral or liquidate firms in the case of default, to remove 
managers in corporate reorganizations, and to have a high priority relative to other claimants in corporate 
bankruptcy. 
9 The empirical evidence finds that neither of the two models (bank-based or market-based) is preferred (La 
Porta et al., 1997; Levine, 1998; and Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2000).   5 
evidence is weak
10. A high concentration of the banking system should be, in principle, detrimental 
but the evidence is not clear for banks (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). Finally, the occurrence of 
banking crises should also be detrimental, particularly if caused by an excessively rapid and 
liberalization process, which leads to an unsustainable growth of the financial system, but there is no 
empirical evidence, to the best of our knowledge.  
 
The most widely  accepted  macroeconomic factors affecting financial development are wealth 
(positively) and inflation (negatively). Jaffee and Levonian (2000) find that both GDP per capita and 
savings are positively associated with financial development. However, the causality is hard to 
determine since there could also be a positive impact of financial development on savings and GDP 
per capita, through higher economic growth. As regards inflation, Boyd, Levine and Smith (2000) and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) show empirical evidence that, at low-to-moderate rates of 
inflation, increases in inflation hamper financial development, in terms of lower volumes of bank 
lending to the private sector
11.  
 
Finally, among the economic policies, the role of fiscal policy is controversial. An expansionary 
fiscal deficit, financed by government bonds and not by seignorage, will increase the size of the 
financial sector if defined in a broad sense.  On the contrary, an increase in the government bonds 
held by domestic banks may crowd-out private credit, and thus have a negative impact on narrower 
definitions of financial development. The exchange rate regime is another important policy variable 
for which there is no consensus in the literature.  While Frankel and Rose (1998) argue that fixed 
exchange rate regimes are likely to stimulate investment and trade, thus fostering economic growth, 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) find the opposite result for emerging countries. 
 
3. OBJECTIVE OF THE PAPER  
 
This paper has two main objectives: (i) improve upon existing measures of financial development by 
constructing a comprehensive indicator; and (ii) assess empirically the role of two potentially crucial 
institutions for the financial system: the central bank and financial regulation and supervision.   
 
To construct a comprehensive definition of financial development, we shall focus on two main 
aspects: financial size and efficiency
12. The first measures  the amount of funds intermediated. The 
second concentrates on how they are intermediated. In  fact, an efficient financial system can be 
considered as one which wastes the least amount of resources possible in the intermediation process. 
In principle, financial size and efficiency should move together because of the economies of scale and 
scope that a larger size allows, contributing to higher efficiency. This is what Bossone and Lee (2002) 
find for the banking system. However there may be cases in which size and efficiency do not go hand 
in hand. For instance, engineering a too rapid growth of the financial system may lead to riskier 
behavior on the part of financial institutions and thus, to an inefficient allocation of funds. Also, the 
establishment or growth of state-owned banks, or the protection of national players on the basis of 
“infant industry” arguments may actually hinder the good functioning of the financial system. To add 
to the difficulty, countries vary widely in terms of financial instruments and habits, something that 
makes definitions hard to compare.  The next section describes the way in which we have tackled 
these aggregation difficulties. 
 
                         
10 Note that La Porta et al. (2000) find a negative but not significant coefficient for share of state-owned banks. 
11 In addition, Khan et al. (2001) find that there is not only a level above which inflation negatively affect 
financial deepening (namely 6%) but also a minimum level of inflation (3%) below which the financial system 
may be hurt.   
12  Gelbard and Leite (1999) construct a comprehensive measure of financial development based on six aspects: 
the market structure and competitiveness of the system, the availability of financial products, the degree of 
financial liberalization, the institutional environment under which the system operates, the degree of integration 
with foreign financial markets, and the degree of sophistication of  monetary policy instruments. We consider 
most of these aspects as potential determinants of the size and efficiency of the financial system, on which we 
concentrate.   6 
As for the second objective, assessing the impact of the central bank and financial regulation and 
supervision, we choose the three main characteristics for each of them on the basis of their l ikely 
relation with the financial system. We now discuss the expected sign of each of the six variables, 
based on the previously reviewed literature. 
 
Starting with the central bank, for many years the  payments system were not considered to be a 
subject for active interest for financial economists but the massive increase in turnover and the much 
faster transfer of funds because of technological advances has given the payment system a pivotal role 
in the financial system. The fact that there are risks inherent to the functioning of the payments system 
which affect financial stability and the conduct of monetary policy, explain why the central bank may 
have a role to play. This can have different forms: the direct operation of the payments system, which 
includes carrying out the central bank own transactions and on behalf of its clients (particularly the 
public sector), and conducting open market operations through the payment system, so as to 
implement monetary policy. There are other functions, more directly related with financial stability 
that the central bank may perform, namely guarantying daily settlements and extending intraday credit 
into overnight credit. Its oversight functions imply arbitrating in the event of complaints and handling 
clearing procedures. Finally, there are less formal oversight function, such as promoting 
competitiveness, the security and safety of transactions, and encouraging the adoption of technical 
standards.   
 
In sum, the potential benefits of the central bank running the system have to be weighed against moral 
hazard considerations. Whether a larger central bank involvement in the payments system fosters or 
hinders financial development will very much depend on how central banks perform payments as 
compared to private institutions. Since central banks are generally better equipped compared to the 
private sector in emerging countries, the a priori will clearly be positive in this case (Table A below 
summarizes the a priori signs for each objective variable).    
 
The central bank LOLR functions have two main aspects: the provision of liquidity to illiquid but 
solvent institutions, and to insolvent institutions.  As previously reviewed, the former is the standard 
case. As for the latter, there are circumstances such as the risk of contagion, which make it appealing 
at least for a strand of the literature. How broad the range of LOLR functions will crucially depend on 
the trade-off between fostering banking system stability and increasing moral hazard. Broader LOLR 
functions (i.e. the possibility to inject funds even to insolvent institutions if circumstances warrant it) 
will be beneficial for financial development in so far as they avoid systemic problems, which reduce 
the public’s trust in the financial system. However, if that increases moral hazard because unsound 
institutions manage to continue to operate, the efficiency of the financial system will be hampered.  
Therefore, the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous. 
 
The main issue in the design of  central bank objectives, a s far as financial development is 
concerned, is how broad or narrow those objectives are. Whether narrower objectives are preferred for 
financial development crucially depends on whether synergies, or else trade-offs, exist between price 
stability and financial stability (and thereby between price stability and financial development). If 
synergies exist, a central bank with a narrow objective (namely price stability) would still be able to 
contribute to financial development since both do not conflict. On the contrary, if there is a trade-off 
between the two, central banks may need to target other variables (apart from price stability) to better 
contribute to financial development. The expected sign of this variable is therefore ambiguous. 
 
We also consider  financial regulation and supervision since the existence of banks imply the 
existence of institutions  regulating and supervising them. The inter-temporal nature of banks’ 
business makes them vulnerable (World Bank, 2001a), prone to adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems and even to straightforward looting in the absence of an enabling regulatory framework. In 
addition, as banks are highly leveraged institutions, they may be tempted to maximize those returns 
through excessive risk taking. For all these reasons, well-designed bank regulation and supervision are 
crucial to limit moral hazard and ensure that banks have the right incentives to allocate their resources 
prudently. However, this is not easy to achieve. The absence of a clear sense of the relative   7 
importance of the very many different regulatory standards is a problem particularly for emerging 
countries with a weaker institutional context. An additional problem is the implementation of 
prudential regulation and its enforcement, which involves acquiring the necessary supervisory skills 
and enough independence from potential lobbing.  
 
Taking the above issues into account, we focus on three aspects of regulation and supervision: the 
quality of regulation, the  enforcement power of supervisors and the  independence  of the 
responsible authorities. We choose these three dimensions for a few practical reasons. In the first 
place, regulation is at the base of the stability of any banking system, since it tends to limit 
insufficient capital, excessive risk-taking, or limited institutional capacity. Secondly, one of the most 
frequently mentioned weaknesses in this area is the lack of enforcement power, together with the late 
recognition of problems in bank balance sheets. Finally, lack of political will, political interference or 
inadequate staffing and budget are also considered important problems.  We focus on political 
independence (rather than financial) for two main reasons. First, it is the starting point of the 
empirical literature on central bank independence
13, and second, there are data limitations for other 
aspects of independence (such as quality of the staff, their remuneration and the agency’s budget) for 
a large number of countries. The expected sign is obviously positive for the three variables pertaining 
to bank regulation and supervision. Finally, we control for the location of the responsibilities for 
regulation and supervision, which could potentially be related to the way in which the two are carried 
out. 
Table A: 
Objective variables: expected results
(Expected sign)
Central bank




Quality of Regulation positive
Supervisory Enforcement  positive
Independence of Supervisors positive  
 
 
4. CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES AND DATA AVAILABILITY 
 
•  Dependent variable 
 
We construct the most comprehensive indicator of financial development on the basis of existing data 
for the largest possible number of countries, namely 134. We also construct separate summary 
indicators for the two main aspects of financial development: size and efficiency. Finally, we build an 
indicator of the development of the banking system (excluding capital markets), since our objective 
variables, the central bank functions and the design of bank regulation and supervision, should affect 
the banking system more directly. 
 
We choose nine indicators of financial development. Four of them relate to the size of the financial 
system and five to its efficiency. The four size variables are: liquid liabilities of banks and other 
deposit-taking institutions, bank credit to the private sector, stock market capitalization, and bonds 
outstanding, all as a percentage of GDP
14. The detailed definition and the data sources for all variables 
can be found in Appendix 1, a nd the main statistics in Table 1, Appendix 2. Among the  five 
efficiency variables, three relate to the banking system: the inverse of the spread between banks’ 
lending and deposit rates, the inverse of the net interest margin and the inverse of banks’ overhead 
                         
13 Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) 
14 This variable, as mentioned in the review of the literature, also reflects efficiency to the extent that it is more 
growth enhancing that bank credit to the public sector.      8 
costs. The other two reflect the efficiency of the stock market: the turnover of the stock exchange and 
the number of companies listed in the stock exchange. Unfortunately, there is no indicator of the 
efficiency of the bond market for a sufficiently large enough number of countries. The year chosen to 
construct the dependent variable is 2000 whenever available
15. 
 
It seems quite clear that the above measures of financial development are difficult to aggregate.  
While those of financial size are generally expressed in terms of GDP, this is not the case for many of 
the efficiency measures. In addition, some of them might be more relevant that others, as is the case of 
bank credit to the private sector. The methodology used to aggregate them is described in the next 
section.  
 
§  Objective variables 
 
Regarding the payments system, countries are ranked on the basis of five potential functions that 
their central banks may carry out:  (i) the formal oversight of the system, (ii) the informal one
16,  
(iii) the direct operation of the payment system, (iv) the coverage of credit and liquidity risks through 
the extension of intraday credit into overnight credit, and (v) the guarantee of settlement failure. This 
yields an index ranging from 0 to 5; where 0 means no involvement and 5 implies the maximum 
involvement possible. The data has been collected from different sources listed in Appendix 1, as for 
the rest of the variables.  
 
We measure the broadness of the central bank LOLR functions through an index, which takes the 
value of 2 when the central bank’s mandate envisages liquidity injections even to insolvent 
institutions (and not only to illiquid ones) either because of systemic risk or other reasons (we do not 
have enough information to distinguish between the two). The index takes the value of 1 when only 
illiquid, but solvent, institutions can receive funds and 0 in the rare cases where no institution, as a 
single entity, can obtain liquidity from the central bank.  
 
For the central bank objectives we construct an index that increases the broader these objectives are 
and ranging from 0 to 1. Those central banks which have price stability as a major, or single, objective 
in the charter, are coded as narrowest, receiving a value of 0; those whose first priority is assigned to 
an objective generally not conflicting with price stability, such as an exchange rate anchor, are ranked 
as relatively narrow, with a value of 0,33; those with price or exchange rate stability are listed among 
the objectives but with other potentially conflicting objectives, such as economic growth and 
employment, receive a value of 0,66; and those where the exchange rate or price stability are not even 
mentioned in the list of their objectives take the value of 1.  
 
Moving to the quality of financial regulation and supervision, the quality of regulation measures the 
stringency of regulation on capital adequacy on the basis of an index, ranging from 0 to 9, with higher 
values indicating greater stringency. The enforcement power of the supervisory authority measures 
(with an index ranging from a minimum value of 0 to 16) different aspects, such as to what extent the 
law establishes pre-determined levels of bank solvency deterioration that would force automatic 
intervention, as well as the power of supervisors to restructure and reorganize a troubled bank and to 
declare a deeply troubled bank insolvent. The degree of independence of the supervisory authority is 
based on the appointment and removal of the agency directors, and their accountability. The index 
ranges from a minimum 0 to 5; it takes the value 0 when supervisors are directly appointed by the 
Government, and 5 if appointed by, and accountable to, Congress
17. 
                         
15 A few variables were available only for 1997, 1998 or 1999. In any event, data are always for the same year 
for each of the variables to avoid time differences. This is particularly relevant for the stock market 
capitalization and its turnover, which has experienced large trend over time worldwide. 
16 This includes fostering competition and the implementation of standards through informal means, such as 
moral suasion. 
17 To test the robustness of our results, we create another variable measuring the independence of the 
supervisors from a different database (Quintyn and Taylor, 2002). The relatively similar scope of the database, 
in terms of the questions asked allows for comparability of the indexes. The drawback is, however, that this   9 
Finally, to control for the location of regulation and supervision, we use a dummy variable, which 
takes the value of 1 if the central bank is responsible for supervision and 0 otherwise. We do not 
differentiate between separate and government agencies because of data limitations. In any event, this 
should be reflected to same extent in the index of supervisory independence.  
 
§  Control variables  
 
Among the potential control variables previously surveyed, we choose all for which a relatively large 
number of observations is available. The a-priori signs of each variable can be found below, on Table 
B. These are three general institutional variables and one specific of the financial system: (i) The rule 
of law (a low score indicating less tradition for law and order); (ii) a creditors’ rights index (a low 
score standing for weak creditor protection); (iii) an index of economic freedom (increasing the more 
market oriented a country’s economy); and (iv) the deposit insurance scheme, reflected in a dummy 
which takes the value of  1 when limited and explicit and 0 otherwise. 
 
Four financial-system related variables are included: (i) the financial system structure, constructed as 
the absolute value of one minus the ratio of banks’ liquid liabilities (in the numerator) to the stock 
market capitalization plus the bond market outstanding (in the denominator), all as a percentage of 
GDP; the closer to zero the difference the more balanced the financial structure will be; (ii) foreign 
participation in the banking system, measured as the percentage of foreign bank assets to total bank 
assets: (iii) bank concentration, defined as the share of the three largest banks´ assets in total bank 
assets; and (iv) past banking crisis events stemming from too rapid financial liberalization
18. It should 
be noted that the share of public ownership has been excluded from the empirical analysis because of 
lack of data for such a large number of countries. 
 
The macroeconomic variables chosen are: (i) per capita GDP measured in terms of purchasing power 
parity (PPP); (ii) gross domestic saving as a share of GDP; and (iii) inflation, measured as the annual 
change in the consumer price index. Finally, two important policy variables are also included: (iii) the 
fiscal deficit, expressed as a share of GDP; and (ii) the exchange rate regime, for which a de-facto 
definition has been used which takes a higher value the more fixed the exchange rate regime is.   
 
Table B 
Control variables: expected results
(Expected sign)
Institutional
Rule of law positive
Creditors' rights positive
Economic freedom index positive
Deposit Insurance Scheme ambiguous
Financial system-related
Unbalanced financial structure negative
Foreign participation broadly positive
Bank concentration broadly negative
Financial crisis after liberalization negative
Macroeconomic





Exchange rate regime ambiguous  
                                                                              
database is available for much fewer countries, namely 30 instead of 86 for the baseline database (Barth, Caprio 
and Levine 2001a). We, therefore, still need to use the information from Barth, Caprio an d Levine (2001a) for 
many of the observations of this new index, not to lose too many degrees of freedom. 
18 This variable is the interaction of two dummies: one which takes the value of one when a country experienced 
a banking crisis in the period 1994-97, and a liberalization dummy taking the value of 1 if a country has 
undergone a liberalization process in the years prior to the crisis, namely from 1985 to the early 1990s.  
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•  Data availability 
 
We have collected data for 134 countries and we have constructed a comprehensive indicator of 
financial development for all of them (the list of countries can be found in the different Graphs of 
Appendix 3). However, for the empirical exercise, we reduce the number to avoid a potential “small 
country” bias. Very small countries may not fulfill the necessary conditions to build their own 
institutions in the same way as relatively larger countries can, as argued by Bossone et al (2001), and 
tend to have much larger financial sectors, particularly if they operate as off-shore financial centers. 
We, thus, exclude countries whose GDP is less than 16 USD bn (in PPP terms) from the baseline  
regression – namely 55 - although robustness tests will be conducted including all 134 countries. The 
cut-off point has been chosen so as to exclude all off-shore financial centers such as Luxembourg, 
Cyprus, or Panama 
19. The number of observations for the baseline regression is, thus, 79 countries 
(21 industrial and 58 emerging).  
 
It is worth noting in the summary statistics and Graphs 5 to 13 in Appendix 3 that some countries lack 
information for some of the variables with which we calculate principal components. The worst case 
is the bond market with only 52 countries. This missing data problem will be relatively less 
problematic in so far as it is of “ignorable” nature (Griliches, 1986). This means that data is not 
available for reasons unrelated to the fact that other observations in the sample are complete. There 
are several reasons to consider our case of “ignorable” nature: the data set is composed of surveys 
from different origin and, therefore, not related to each other. Some of these surveys are “global”, in 
the sense that they have been launched to virtually all countries, and have few missing observations. 
The fact that the countries for which there are missing observations in some questionnaires have 
answered to o thers reduces the chances that they wanted to hide relevant information, limiting, 
therefore, the risk of finding ourselves in the non-ignorable case. The other surveys are “selective” 
(i.e. they have only been launched for a specific group of countries) but the researcher generally tries 
to balance different types of countries to avoid sample selection problems. Having a non-ignorable 
type of missing data problem allows us to use simple extrapolation techniques rather than more 
complicated methods, and still obtain unbiased estimators (Little and Schenker, 1995). However, it 
should be noted that the gain in efficiency through these extrapolation techniques might be illusory, 
because there is no additional variation present in the predicted values.  
 
Taking  the nature of the missing data into account, for the definition of financial development we 
include countries for which data for year 2000 exists for at least 2 of the variables and fill the missing 
observations in several ways. In the case of the bank credit to the private sector, we extrapolate the 
information from their bank liquid liabilities. In the case of the bond outstanding, many missing 
observations are assigned a zero value since they refer to countries where these markets are known to 
be virtually, or literally, inexistent. For the other components of the dependent variable, missing data 
were given a value equal to the average of the country’s same income level group, based on Beck et al 
(1999) per capita income classification. In this way, we come up with a broad definition for as many 
as 134 countries, introducing the minimum distortions possible and robustness tests will be conducted 
to confirm this. Finally, missing observations in the control variables of the regression are completed 




5. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND STYLIZED FACTS 
 
•  Constructing the dependent variable: a comprehensive definition of financial development 
 
                         
19 The list of countries, which have been dropped for the empirical exercise, is included in Appendix 2, Graph 5.  
20 Macroeconomic, economic policy and financial-system related variables are not necessarily influenced by the 
income group they belong to.    11 
The heterogeneity of the available indicators of financial development (particularly as concerns 
efficiency) does not allow us to use a simple aggregation. We need multivariate analysis techniques. 
Among the different ones, we choose  principal components (Jackson, 1991; and Peña, 1998) 
because it is one of the least restrictive to summarize the information contained in several variables. 
As a brief comparison, cluster analysis requires a subjective decision on the cut-off distance for 
grouping countries. In addition, factors analysis requires the variable to follow a normal distribution
21. 
Finally, principal components analysis does require the variables to be positively correlated, so that 
the final summary variable can be easily interpreted as a weighted average. Our data fulfill this last 
condition. 
  
The principal components technique uses a restricted set of variables, j, to describe other variables, k, 
where the j variables are a subset of the k ones (j < k). The subset of j variables (the principal 
components) is computed as a linear combination of the original k variables. Among the j principal 
components, there is one which best explains the variance of the original variables; this is the one 
with the highest eigenvalue, which necessarily has to be larger than one. The results of  of principal 
components applied to our data will be shown in the next section. 
 
To obtain a comprehensive definition of financial development with principal components we use the 
nine variables previously described. These are: bank liquid liabilities, the inverse of interest rate 
spreads, the inverse of banks’ overhead costs, the inverse of net interest margin, bank credit to the 
private sector, stock market capitalization, number of listed companies in the stock exchange, stock 
market turnover and bonds outstanding. Also, using principal components, we construct two separate 
indicators of financial size and financial efficiency. For the first one we take the first four variables 
mentioned above, and for financial efficiency the last five. Finally, we construct an indicator of 
banking sector development with the five relevant variables: bank liquid liabilities, bank credit to the 
private sector, the inverse of interest rate spreads, the inverse of banks’ overhead cost and the inverse 
of the net interest margin. The weight that each variable has for each of the measures of financial 
development, as well as the country classification, is shown in the next section. 
 
•  Regression methodology 
 
We test the relevance of the central bank and financial regulation in the development of the financial 
system using a cross-section regression for 79 countries.  Panel regression is not an option because 
there is only one observation available for our objective variables. This is also true for some of the 
control variables (mainly the institutional ones). A panel would obviously imply an acceptable loss of 
observations. 
  
We, thus, run OLS on a cross-section, and regress financial development (defined with principal 
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(i)  yi are the nine indicators of financial development to which the principal component 
analysis is applied. 
                         
21 See Hair et al (1998) for a review of the different techniques of multivariate analysis   12 
(ii)  ? i are the weights obtained from the principal component analysis for each of the nine 
indicators. 
(iii)  fdevn is the comprehensive indicator of financial development.  
(iv)  cbj are the central bank-related objective variables and a1j   their coefficients. 
(v)  regk are the regulation and supervision-related variables and a2j are their coefficients. 
(vi)  insti are the four institutional control variables, and ß1 their coefficients. 
(vii)  fin j are the four control variables related to the financial system and ß2 their coefficients. 
(viii)  macm are the three macro-related control variables  and ß3  their coefficients. 
(ix)  pol p are the two policy- related control variables and ß4 their coefficients. 
 
Given that countries are clearly heterogeneous in our sample of 79 countries, we break it into 
industrial and emerging countries (21 and 58 observations, respectively). Acknowledging the scarcity 
of observations, this separation allows finding potential differences in the role of our objective 
variables in clearly differentiated groups.  
 
There are several issues to take into account in our regression exercise. The first is 
heteroschedasticity, given the structural differences between countries. We regress with robust 
standard errors to minimize this problem. We also control for  outliers, by excluding awkward 
observations from the components of the dependent variable (barred lines in Graphs 5 to 13, in 
Appendix 3) and, in the case of inflation, taking the log (1+inflation) and excluding those values 
above 150%. Collinearity problems do not seem too large on the basis of relatively low correlations 
between regressors (Table 2 in Appendix 2). However, a very important limitation is the  small 
number of observations. To minimize this problem, to the extent possible given the characteristics of 
the study, we only include income per capita as control variable in most of the regression exercises. 
Finally, endogeneity is another potential problem, which is particularly difficult to tackle in a cross 
section exercise such as this. We take data older than 2000 for all our regressors, as mentioned in the 
previous section, while maintaining year 2000 data for most all components of the dependent variable 
(for details as to the year chosen for each variable see Appendix 1). In addition, we conduct a 
robustness test with the level of the financial development in the past, as control variable.   
 
•  Stylized facts 
 
Before conducting the regression, we look at the main statistics of our regressors in Table 1 
(Appendix 2). The involvement of the central bank in the payment system is larger, on average, in 
industrial countries than in emerging ones and the central bank objectives are also broader. On the 
contrary, emerging countries’ central banks have broader LOLR mandate, on average. Finally, the 
quality of regulation and supervision is higher, on average, in industrial countries, except for the 
enforcement power, which is also the variable with the largest standard deviation.  
 
When looking at the correlation matrix between the dependent variable (the comprehensive definition 
of financial development) and the regressors (Table 2, Appendix 2), we find that the GDP per capita 
has the highest correlation with financial development, obviously positive, followed by some 
institutional variables (the rule of law and the degree of economic freedom), and the savings rate. 
Inflation is negatively correlated with financial development, in line with the economic literature. 
Financial -related regressors are all negatively correlated with financial development. Some are clearly 
expected from the literature, as for the unbalanced the financial structure (in terms of the share of the 
capital markets versus the banking system) and the occurrence of banking crises after a period of 
financial liberalization. Others much less so, as for the participation of foreign banks and  the degree 
of concentration in the banking system. Finally, all our objectives variables are positively correlated, 
although in some cases with very low coefficients (LOLR and supervisory independence). These are 
obviously just bi-variable correlations from which no conclusions can be drawn.  
 
We also conduct conditional probabilities, to find some stylized facts on the relation between our 
objective variables (central bank features and regulation and supervision) and the degree of financial 
development (results are available in Appendix 4). Aware of the marked differences between   13 
industrial and emerging countries, we calculate conditional probabilities for the industrial and 
emerging country groups, as well as for the full sample. We separate each of the three samples in two  
equal groups: the best performers and the worst performers. To this end we compare their degree of 
financial development (measure with our summary indicator) with the median of the group. 
We find the following general traits: (i) the involvement of the central bank in the payments system is 
slightly larger in the best performing group for the full sample and emerging countries. No clear trend 
is found for industrial countries. (see graphs in Set 1, Appendix 4). (ii) Best performing countries have 
central banks with large LOLR mandates in the three samples (see Set 2). (iii) As in the case of  
LOLR, best performers tend to have broader central bank objectives, both in industrial and emerging 
countries but not so much when we look at the total sample (see Set 3). (iv) The quality of regulation 
is slightly better in the best performing industrial countries than in the worst performing group, while 
it is very similar for all emerging countries and the full sample (see Set 4). (v) The enforcement power 
is clearly better in the best performing industrial countries, but no trend exists for emerging countries 
or the total sample (see Set 5). (vi) Finally, for the independence of supervisors there is no clear trend 
in the full sample but it is clearly higher in the best performing industrial countries and lower in 
emerging countries (see Set 6). In the latter case, there are fifty countries in the worst performing 
group with very large supervisory independence (ranking 4 out of 5)  while there are other ten with 
extremely low independence (ranking 0).  This is an interesting case, which will be further analyzed 
in the next section.  
 
6. RESULTS  
 
•  A comprehensive definition of financial development 
 
Applying principal components to the nine variables chosen, we obtain two relevant eigenvalues (i.e., 
larger than 1), the first being clearly superior since it explains 52% of the total variance, compared to 
11% for the second (see table in the middle in Appendix 5). This is possible thanks to the relatively 
high positive correlations between the nine variables chosen for this comprehensive definition (upper 
table of same section).  From this eigenvalue, we obtain the weights (or eigenvectors) of each of the 
nine components of the linear combination (see  lower table, first column), which constitutes our 
summary dependent variable. Two things are worth noting: First, the variable bank credit to the 
private sector, generally considered as the most meaningful indicator of financial development, has 
the largest weight in that linear combination. Second, the sum of the weights of the four indicators of 
financial size is close to the sum of weights of the five indicators of financial efficiency (1,43 to 1,56). 
In other words, this summary definition is well balanced between size and efficiency. 
 
The partial measures of financial development (financial size, efficiency and banking system 
development) are also obtained through principal components. There is only one relevant eigenvalue 
in each case. For financial size and banking system development, bank credit to the private sector is 
again the most relevant variable. For financial efficiency, the net interest margin carries the largest 
weight
22.   
 
The classification of the 134 countries in terms of the comprehensive definition of financial 
development can be found in Graph 1 (Appendix 3). There are a few unexpected countries among the 
best-performers, and more generally across our sample list. To clarify the reasons behind this ranking, 
we look into the two different components, size and efficiency.  
 
We identify two emerging Asian countries (Malaysia and China) among the 15% best performing 
countries in terms of financial size. A number of small countries (namely Jordan, Malta, Cyprus or 
Bahamas) also show a relatively high level of financial  size, higher even than industrial countries, 
such as Greece or Iceland (Graph 2). When looking at the different components of size, Malaysia and 
China rank high for very similar reasons: large banking sectors as measured by liquid liabilities to 
                         
22 Results are available upon request.   14 
GDP (Graph 5), sizable domestic bond markets (Graph 13), and in the case of Malaysia, also a very 
large stock market capitalization (Graph 12). In the same vein, Jordan’s high ranking is explained by 
its relatively large stock market capitalization in terms of GDP in our dataset. Finally, Malta, Cyprus 
and Bahamas share the common characteristic of being small countries. This feature has been 
documented by the literature as able to explain comparatively larger financial systems to larger 
countries of similar characteristics.  
 
In the same vein, the unexpectedly high degree of financial efficiency explains certain surprising 
rankings in the summary indicator of financial development. Again Malaysia, but also Bahamas and 
the Slovak Republic perform better than industrial countries such as France or Italy because of very 
high stock market turnovers. Malaysia also has thin bank spreads (Graph 6), low overhead costs in the 
banking sector (Graph 7), and a large number of listed companies in the stock exchange (Graph 10). 
Finally, South Korea ranks first in terms of financial efficiency even having treated its extremely thin 
spreads (less than half the second best performer, Switzerland) as an outlier. As before, the case of 
Bahamas shows that small (off-shore) countries influence the classification. At the bottom of the 
classification, there are fewer surprises. Venezuela is probably one, surrounded by African countries. 
Looking at its classification in terms of size and efficiency, Venezuela appears low on both accounts: 
it has a small bank system and stock market, as well as high interest rate spreads and overhead costs 
 
In sum, in our broad definition of financial development, a few Asian countries appear high in the 
ranking because of the size of their financial systems (China, Korea) but also in some cases because 
of their efficiency (Malaysia). Small countries are generally ranked high (for example Swaziland 
appears before Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay or Colombia) for reasons which in some cases may be 
directly related to their size and not . As mentioned before, small countries will be excluded from the 
baseline regression, in view of a  potential “small-country” bias.  
 
•  The role central bank and regulation and supervision on financial development 
 
We conduct different sets of regressions using robust standard error OLS for the full sample, as well 
as the emerging and industrial country groups, separately. In the baseline case (see equation above), 
we regress the comprehensive definition of financial development on the six objective variable and all 
the control variables.  Because of the lack of degrees of freedom, we can only conduct the regression 
for the full sample and the emerging country group but not for industrial countries (only 21 available). 
  
The cross-country regression for the full sample shows that a relatively large involvement of the 
central bank in the payment system is beneficial for financial development, other things given, at a 
5% significance level, both for the full sample and for emerging countries (Table 1 below). Countries 
with broader central bank objectives perform also better in terms of financial development in the two 
samples.  In addition, the joint significance test of the three central bank functions confirms that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the three central bank aspects, together, influence financial 
development. As for regulation and supervision, none of the variables (quality of regulation, 
supervisory enforcement and independence) significantly affect financial development.  
 
Moving to the control variables we find evidence that stronger creditor rights and a larger degree of 
economic freedom foster financial development. In the case of creditor rights, the result is statically 
more significant for the sample of emerging countries, which would be expected in terms of economic 
significance. Also, an unbalanced financial structure (measured as the distance of each country’s 
financial system from a situation where the banking system and the capital markets have equal 
weight) is found to hinder financial development both in the full sample and in that of emerging 
countries. This result is particularly interesting because, having a clearly a-priori in the  literature, it 
had not been confirmed empirically yet.  Banking crisis stemming from financial liberalization are 
also found detrimental for financial development, and in a more significant way in emerging 
countries, as would be expected. Finally, higher income per capita strongly contributes to financial 
development and inflation hinders it. In sum, using our summary definition of financial development, 
the results found for the control variables broadly confirm those where there is consensus in the   15 
literature, except for the domestic saving rate and the foreign ownership of the banking system. The 





F-test (p-value) ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust
Financial development principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.3407 ** (2.01) 0.5098 ** (2.41)
LOLR 0.5685 (1.00) 0.4387 (0.78)
Objectives 1.3536 ** (2.24) 1.3377 ** (2.05)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system and 
LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.020 ** 0.047 **
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.0186 (-0.21) -0.0133 (-0.14)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0408 (0.76) 0.0569 (0.77)
Independence of Supervisors -0.0811 (-0.41) -0.3763 (-1.38)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement power 
and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.877 0.537
Control variables
Institutional
Rule of law -0.0565 (-0.53) -0.0599 (-0.40)
Creditors' rights 0.2651 * (1.78) 0.5125 ** (2.22)
Economic freedom index 0.2524 ** (2.42) 0.2206 ** (2.06)
Deposit Insurance Scheme -0.2427 (-0.67) -0.1130 (-0.18)
Joint test for  institutional variables
F-test (p-value) 0.023 ** 0.016 **
Financial system-related
Unbalanced financial structure -0.0287 ** (-2.20) -0.0287 * (-1.95)
Foreign participation 0.4633 (0.52) 1.2365 (1.00)
Bank concentration -0.0166 (-1.50) -0.0173 (-1.04)
Financial crisis after liberalization -0.7251 * (-1.89) -0.9549 ** (-1.97)
Joint test for financial system related variables
F-test (p-value) 0.012 ** 0.054 *
Macroeconomic
GDP per capita 1.2805 ** (4.59) 1.3733 ** (3.94)
Domestic savings 0.0289 (1.38) 0.0265 (1.05)
Inflation -4.3758 ** (-2.99) -3.3879 ** (-2.07)
Joint test for macroeconomic variables
F-test (p-value) 0.000 ** 0.000 **
Economic policies
Fiscal deficit 0.0361 (0.82) 0.0348 (0.72)
Exchange rate regime -0.1964 (-0.88) -0.2526 (-1.14)
Joint test for economic policy variables
F-test (p-value) 0.534 0.386
constant -1.9748 (-0.91) -2.0855 (-0.77)
Table 1. Baseline exercise with all control variables
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As a second step, in order to gain some degrees of freedom, we exclude the control variables except 
for the income per capita, which is the most relevant, both in the economic literature and has the 
highest correlation with the dependent variable. This allows conducting separate regressions for 
industrial countries and will constitute the baseline of all robustness exercise. The results are similar 
as before, with one notable exception: the supervisory independence is now significant but with 
opposite signs in industrial and emerging countries: it is positive in the former at a 5% significance 
level and negative i n the later at a 10%  significance level (see Table 2 below). This result is not 
completely striking given the conditional probabilities previously shown, but it is not economically 




F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Financial development principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.3465 * (1.87) 0.1860 (0.51) 0.4604 ** (2.29)
LOLR 0.3606 (0.74) 3.7240 ** (6.06) 0.0066 (0.01)
Objectives 1.0453 * (1.79) 2.6475 ** (2.31) 0.9437 (1.23)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system and 
LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.102 0.000 ** 0.148
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.1243 (-1.23) 0.3102 (1.46) -0.1409 (-1.19)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0354 (0.62) 0.0706 (0.61) 0.0204 (0.32)
Independence of Supervisors -0.2037 (-1.08) 0.3796 ** (2.13) -0.4745 * (-1.77)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement power 
and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.493 0.042 ** 0.107
Control variables
GDP per capita 1.7928 ** (10.09) 0.9043 (1.49) 2.0169 ** (5.98)




Table 2. Baseline exercise
0.000 0.000 0.000






We now conduct several robustness tests on the main issues of interest. The results for the objective 
variables are summarized in Table 3 below. The full results are reported in Appendix 6.  
 
The first aims at assessing the reliability of the result found for the supervisory independence. The 
negative sign found in emerging countries may be related to the timing of the reform of the regulatory 
and supervisory institutions, which started earlier in the developed countries (generally in the 1980s) 
and later in emerging countries (broadly in the 1990s). Many of the latter countries are still in the 
transition towards a better regulation and supervision, with no clear improvement in the financial 
system yet, but our database already incorporates the improvement. 
 
Although we do not have earlier data available for supervisory independence to avoid this timing 
problem, we do have another database, compiled by Quintyn and Taylor (2002), on supervisory 
independence. Using a comparable index of supervisory independence compiled from this database
23, 
we find that supervisory independence is no longer significant, not only in the sample of emerging 
countries but also in that of industrial ones (Table 1 in Appendix 6).  
                         
23 The countries for which no information is available in Quintyn and Taylor (2002) have kept the information 
in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a). In addition, the measure of independence has been constructed on the basis 
of the same questions, to allow for the comparability of the results.   17 
 
Notwithstanding the above result, the marked differences found in the conditional probabilities 
between industrial and emerging countries call for a more in-depth analysis of this issue.   We check 
whether it may be related to the general institutional framework, and in particularly the rule of law. 
The intuition behind is that legal supervisory independence is probably easier to implement in 
industrial countries than in emerging ones. In facts, supervisors in emerging countries may be less 
able to challenge weak banks if they are not protected. The rule of law should be a good proxy to 
measure the degree of implementation of a country’s legal framework, including the possibility of 
independent institutions to take action. We, thus control, for each country’s possibilities to apply the 
law, by interacting the rule of law
24 with the index of supervisory independence. Interestingly, the 
new variable significantly contributes to financial development, rather than hindering it (see Table 2 
in Appendix 6).  
 
Moving to more general robustness tests, we control, to the maximum extent possible, for potential 
endogeneity, by including the level of financial development in our starting year (1997)
 25. The reason 
why we have not included it in previous exercises is its very high correlation with income per capita 
which would have led to collinearity problems. The results show that relatively broad central bank 
objectives are beneficial for industrial countries but not for emerging countries as was found in the 
baseline  We also find that higher quality regulation and stronger supervisory enforcement  contribute 
to financial development in industrial countries but the significance of the supervisory independence 
is lost (see Table 3 in Appendix 6). 
 
Until now, no attention has been paid to which agency is responsible for regulation and supervision, 
but only to the way in which these functions are performed. To test whether the location of these 
responsibilities makes a difference in terms of the development of the financial system, we introduce 
an additional variable, a dummy, which takes the value of one if the central bank is the responsible 
agency for supervision and zero otherwise. As shown in Table 4 in Appendix 6, the location of the 
supervisory responsibilities does not appear to matter in two ways: First, the location variable is not 
found significant in explaining the degree of financial development. Second, the results for our  
objective variables remains basically the same as in the baseline.    
 
We now conduct robustness tests for the choice of the dependent variable, the definition o financial 
development.  First, we use the two previously constructed separate indicators of financial size and 
development as dependent variables. This allows us to account for the fact that financial size and 
efficiency do not necessarily move in the same direction in all cases. This might be particularly 
important for emerging countries, whose financial systems may have grown more rapidly, but also 
more dangerously, in the time period we have chosen (1997-2000), due to the ongoing liberalization 
processes. And efficiency may not necessarily have increased in line with size.  Two differences 
worth noting are found between regressing on size and on efficiency: First, large payment system 
functions significantly foster  size but the result is lost for efficiency. Second, supervisory 
independence negatively affects size, not only for emerging countries but also for full sample. The 
opposite is true for financial efficiency for the sample of industrial countries (Tables 5 and 6 in 
Appendix 6).  
 
Aware that our objective variables are abound to affect more directly the banking system than the 
capital markets, we also conduct the regression on the summary indicator of bank development. The 
results are in line with the baseline case (see Table 7 in Appendix 6).   
                         
24 Kaufman’s index is preferred to La Porta’s because it is compiled for the same year as the degree of 
supervisory independence (1998, instead 1996). This is particularly relevant since both variables will be 
interacted.  
25 As previously mentioned, there is no single starting year for all of them. Macroeconomic and financial-system 
related variables are chosen for a homogeneous year (1997) but there is no possibility to the same for the other 
regressors. The year will depend on when the survey they are drawn from was conducted. The year 1997 is an 
approximate average of the years taken for all other regressors.   18 
 
Finally, we control for the fact that missing data has been extrapolated to construct the comprehensive 
indicator of financial development. We regress on bank credit to the private sector, for which data was 
available for all 79 countries. This variable is preferred to bank liquid liabilities, which also has data 
for all countries in the sample, because it reflects not only the size but also the efficiency of the 
banking system, to some extent. The results for the central bank variables are exactly as when using 
bank development as dependent variable (See Table 8 in Appendix 7). The difference with the broad 
definition of financial development is that the large involvement of the central bank in the payments 
system is not beneficial for the whole sample. In turn, the quality of regulation and supervision appear 
highly significant, as opposed both to what was found for banking sector development and the broad 
definition of financial development. Even the supervisory independence is found to be beneficial for 
emerging countries.  In sum, using bank credit to the private sector, the three supervisory related 
variables are highly significant in statistical terms, coinciding with its economic significance. We also 
regress private credit on all control variables, so as to compare the results found in the baseline. The 
results are similar but the significance of the financial structure is lost while bank concentration is 
found detrimental at a 10% confidence level. 
 
Finally, we conduct two additional robustness tests concerning the quality of the data and the degrees 
of freedom. First, we exclude the 5% minimum and maximum values of the nine components of the 
broad definition of financial development
26. Second, we include the 55 small countries excluded from 
the baseline, so as to have 134 observations. The results are very similar in the first case (Table 10 in 
appendix 6). In the second, the beneficial role of a large involvement of the central bank in the 
payment system is lost for the full sample – but remains for emerging countries – and broad central 
bank objectives appear to contribute to financial development only in the sample of industrial 





                         
26 This is on top of the extreme outliers excluded already in the baseline. These can be found in Graphs 5 to 12.   19 
Table 3: Summary of results for objective variables 
 






Joint Test for 
Central Bank 
Variables




TS IN EM TS IN EM TS IN EM TS IN EM TS IN EM TS IN EM TS IN EM TS IN EM
1          
(main text)
Baseline exercise with all control 
variables
Financial development  ++ NA  ++ NA  ++ NA  ++ NA  NA  NA  ++ NA  ++ NA 
2         
(main text)
Baseline exercise Financial development + ++ ++ ++ ++ - ++ ++
1 
(appendix)
Supervisory  independence with different 
data set Financial development  ++ ++ + ++ ++
2 
(appendix)
Supervisory  independence controlling 
for rule of law
Financial development  NA NA  NA NA  ++ NA NA  NA NA  NA NA  NA NA  ++ NA NA  NA NA  ++
3 
(appendix)
Controlling for endogeneity of financial 
development 
Financial development  ++ + ++ + ++ ++ ++
4 
(appendix)
Including location of regulation and 
supervision 
Financial development  + ++ ++ ++ - ++ +
5 
(appendix)
Financial size as dependent variable Financial size ++ ++ ++ ++ -- - ++ ++
6 
(appendix)
Financial efficiency as dependent 
variable
Financial efficiency ++ + + + ++ ++ ++
7 
(appendix)
Bank development as dependent 
variable
Bank development ++ ++ ++ + + - ++ +
8 
(appendix)
Credit to the private sector as dependent 
variable
Private credit to GDP ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ + ++ ++ ++
9 
(appendix)
Credit to the private sector with all 
control variables
Financial development  NA  NA  ++ NA  ++ NA  NA  NA  ++ NA  ++ NA 
10 
(appendix)
Controlling for outliers in dependent 
variables Financial development  ++ + ++ ++ + + + ++ +
11 
(appendix)
Including small countries Financial development  + ++ ++ ++ ++ ++
NA : Not available    20 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper constructs a new, more comprehensive, definition of financial development, based on nine 
indicators of size and efficiency, using multivariate analysis. It, then, tests the relevance of the central 
bank and bank regulation and supervision on financial development using this newly constructed 
definition, as well as others for robustness. Both aspects are found to be relevant determinants of 
financial development but differences exist between industrial and emerging countries. Broader 
central bank broad objectives and LOLR functions significantly contribute to financial development 
in industrial countries.  The first is in line with the possibility of a trade-off between financial stability 
and price stability, at least as concerns financial development.  However, this result needs to be taken 
with caution since we do not test for the impact of broad central bank objectives on financial stability 
directly nor on price stability, both higher up in the list of central bank priorities. All in all, one could 
argue that as long as having broader objectives does not create a conflict of interest for the central 
bank, these should be preferred in order to foster financial development.  The result for the LOLR is 
in line with the so-called “interventionist” school, which argues in favor of giving the central bank 
discretion to inject liquidity to a bank, independently of its solvency situation, if the circumstances 
warrant it. Unfortunately the survey data we have used doest not allow us to determine for which 
circumstances a larger LOLR mandate is preferred (systemic risk or others) Finally, as expected, 
better quality financial regulation and supervision, including higher independence, also contribute to 
financial development in industrial countries.   
 
For emerging countries, the central bank involvement in the payment system is the most relevant 
variable in fostering financial development. The fact that we do not find the central bank involvement 
in the payment system significant for industrial countries but we do for emerging ones is in line with 
the view that the central bank should only run the payment system as long as there is no private 
institution that can do it better. This implies minimizing settlement risk without incurring moral 
hazard.  In an emerging country it may be more difficult to find a private institution capable of 
minimizing the systemic risk involved in running the payment system.  In addition, some model 
specifications show a positive role for broad central b ank objectives and LOLR functions for 
emerging countries too. The fact that these results are not as strong as for industrial countries may be 
related to the use that emerging countries’ have made of discretion in its central bank objectives 
and/or in thei r use of the LOLR.  Finally, no evidence is found of a positive role of better quality 
regulation and supervision for emerging countries. For some specifications, supervisory independence 
even appears to hinder financial development. We find evidence that this is the case only for countries 
with a very poor rule of law. A policy conclusion that one may draw from this result is that, in 
addition to being legally independent from political interference, regulatory and supervisory 
authorities need to have a legal and institutional framework , which allows them to take the necessary 
actions to preserve a sound financial system.   
 
To summarize, the results found for the comprehensive definition of financial development compares 
relatively well with narrower, but frequently used, indicators of financial development, such as bank 
credit to the private sector.  As far as financial system development is concerned, the regression 
results - notwithstanding its weaknesses in terms of degrees of freedom - argue in favor of a large 
mandate for the central bank, in terms of its objectives, payment system involvement and LOLR. 
High quality regulation and supervision, particularly a high degree of independence, is also found 
beneficial, as long as a institutional framework is in place.  
 
There are too many topics for future research at this stage. First,  it would be interesting to see 
whether the functions that central bank should change over time as the financial system develops – 
some kind an optimal life cycle in the design of central bank. This would require information on 
changes in central bank functions in line with what García Herrero and del Rio (2003) find for 
financial stability. Second, we intend to explore the causality relation between financial development 
and growth, based on our more comprehensive definition. Finally, the interrelation between regulation 
and supervision and the quality of institutions also deserves more research.     21 
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES, YEAR, DEFINITION, SOURCE 
Liquid Liabilities of Banks and other Deposit-Taking Institutions/GDP (2000): Currency plus demand and interest-bearing deposits divided by GDP. International Financial Statistics, IMF 
(2002) 
Bank Spreads between the Lending and Deposit rates (2000): Spread between short-term domestic currency lending and deposit interest rates. International Financial Statistics, IMF (2002) 
Overhead Cost (inverse of) (1997): Ratio of overhead cost to total assets. Overhead costs are the expenses of a business that are not attributable directly to the production or sale of goods. We 
compute them as yearly averages and divide them by total assets. Beck et al. (1999) 
Net Interest Margin (inverse of) (1997): Inverse of bank interest income minus interest expense over overhead cost. Yearly averages, divided by overhead costs. Beck et al. (1999) 
Stock Market Turnover Ratio (2000): Total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the period. Average market capitalization is calculated as 
the average of the end of period values for the current period and the previous period. The World Bank World Development Indicators (2001b) 
Number of Listed Companies in the Stock Exchange (2000): Total number of companies listed in domestic stock exchanges. The World Bank World Development Indicators (2001b) 
Ratio of Bank Lending to the Private Sector/GDP (2000): Share of outstanding loans, purchases of non-equity securities, trade credits and other accounts receivable to the domestic private 
sector that establish a claim for repayment, divided by GDP. The World Bank World Development Indicators (2001b) 
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP (2000): Aggregate capitalization value of all shares listed in the stock exchange divided by GDP. International Financial Corporation (IFC) 
Bonds Outstanding/GDP (2000, 1997): Nominal value of existing domestic bonds, both government and corporate, divided by GDP. Beck et al (1999), Caviglia, Krause and Thimann (2002) 
and Bank of International Settlements (BIS) (2002) 
OBJECTIVE VARIABLES, YEAR, DEFINITION, SOURCE 
Central Bank Objectives (1980-1989): If central banks have price stability as single objective, the variable takes the value of 0, if they assign high priority to a fixed exchange rate, it takes the 
value of 0,33, it they put price or exchange rate stability among the objectives but not the main ones, it is equal to 0,66. Finally, if they do not mention exchange rate or price stability in the list 
of their objectives, it takes the value of 1. Cukierman et al. (1992), and Mahadeva and Sterne (2000). Generally Cukierman et al. (1992) except for countries where the 1990s have implied 
important changes in the central bank objectives. 
Central Bank Payment System Functions (Before 1999): Sum of five dummies. Each equals one if central banks: (i) conduct formal oversight of the payment system, (ii) conduct informal 
oversight, (iii) operate the payment system, (iv) cover credit and liquidity risks through the extension of intraday credit into overnight credit, and/or (v) guarantee settlement failure. Fry et al. 
(1999), Fry et al. (1996) and FSSAs
28 from the IMF and the World Bank. Fry et al. (1996) used to crosscheck for recent changes in the functioning of the payment system. For those countries 
included in both surveys and which underwent changes, older information selected. 
Central Bank LOLR Functions (Before 1999): If LOLR only envisages liquidity injections to the system as a whole, this variable takes a value 0, if injections to single illiquid institutions are 
allowed, it takes a value of 1, and if also includes insolvent institutions, it takes a value of 2. Sinclair (2000), BIS (2000)
¡Error! Marcador no definido. Jácome (2001) and FSSAs
¡Error! Marcador no definido. 
from the IMF and the World Bank 
Quality of Financial Regulation (1998-2000): We calculate this index based on the responses to a broad-based questionnaire by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) concerning existing capital 
and new capital. Questions refer to issues such as minimum required capital-to-asset ratio conforming to Basle guidelines, whether it varies with market risk, or whether the market value of loan 
losses is deducted from reported accounting capital. Each positive answer takes a value of 1 and each negative a value of 0, and the index ranges from 1 to 9. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) 
                         
27 The number of available observations for each variable can be found in Appendix 2.  Year for which the variable is available in brackets and source in italics. 
28 Some of these reports are not for public use yet.   25 
OBJECTIVE VARIABLES, YEAR, DEFINITION, SOURCE (Cont). 
Enforcement Power of Supervisors (1998-2000): We calculate this index based on the answers to the same questionnaire, in the area of the enforcement capacity of bank supervisors. A few of 
the questions are: can supervisors meet with any external auditors to discuss their reports without bank approval? Are auditors legally required to report any misconduct by managers or directors 
to the supervisory authorities? Can the supervisory authorities take legal action against external auditors for negligence? Every positive answer takes a value of 1 and each negative a value of 0. 
The index ranges from 0 to 16. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) 
Independence of the Supervisory Authority (1998-2000, 2002): We calculate this index based on the answers to three questions regarding the independence of the supervisory authority that 
are included in the same questionnaire. The questions are how is head of supervisory agency/other directors removed?, To whom are supervisors accountable?, and How is the head of the 
supervisory agency/other directors appointed? The index ranges from 0 to 5 according the degree of overall independence. For a robustness test we complement this survey with a different one, 
Quintyn and Taylor 2002 with similar questions but a smaller country sample. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a). Quintyn and Taylor (2002) 
Location of Supervisory Responsibilities (Before 1994): This a dummy that takes a value of 1 when the banking supervisory responsibilities are assigned to the Central Bank and 0 otherwise. 
Tuya and Zamalloa (1994) 
CONTROL VARIABLES, YEAR, DEFINITION, SOURCE 
Inflation (1997): Logarithm of one plus the annual change in consumer prices. International Financial Statistics, IMF (2002) 
Fiscal Deficit/GDP (1997): Public deficit. International Financial Statistics, IMF (2002) 
Gross Domestic Saving/GDP (1997): Difference between GDP and public and private consumption divided by GDP. The World Bank Development Indicators (2001b) 
Per Capita GDP in PPP terms (1997): The World Bank Development Indicators (2001b) 
Income per Capita (1999): Real GDP Per Capita in constant dollars (international prices, base year 1985). Penn World Tables 
Financial Structure/GDP (1997): Difference between 1 minus the ratio of banks’ liquid liabilities to the sum of  stock market capitalization and domestic bonds outstanding, all as a percentage 
of GDP, in absolute value. International Financial Statistics, IMF (2002), IFC and The World Bank Development Indicators (2001b) 
Concentration (1997): Bank concentration indicates the weight of the three largest banks´ assets to total assets. Beck et al. (1999) 
Foreign Participation (1997): Share of foreign bank assets as a percentage of total bank assets. A bank is defined as foreign if at least 50% of equity is owned by foreign investors. Beck et al. 
(1999) 
Banking Crises Event (1999): It is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if a banking crisis has occurred between 1994 and 1997 and 0 otherwise. We follow the definition coined by Caprio and 
Klingebiel  (1999) and compare across different surveys  
De-facto Exchange Rate Regimes (1997): This definition is based on an index, which ranges from 3 to 1, 3 being fixed, 2 managed and 1 floating. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
Index of Economic Freedom (1990):  This index includes measures of the size of government, the structure of the economy, the conduct of monetary policy and price stability, the freedom to 
use alternative currencies, the legal structure and poverty rights, as well as the freedom to trade with foreigners, and to exchange in the capital and financial markets. The higher the number the 
more market-oriented a country is. Fraser Institute database 
Creditor rights (1985-1997): The index ranges from 0 to, 4 A high score stands for more rights It aggregates a number of dummies, which have the value of 1 when: the country imposes 
restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization; secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been 
approved (no automatic stay); secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt firm; and when the debtor does not 
retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. La Porta et al. (1998) 
Rule of Law (1996): This index summarizes the law and order tradition in a country and ranges from 1 to 4. A low score indicates less tradition for law and order. Political Risk Services (1996) 
Rule of Law (1998): This measure includes several indicators, such as the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society (including the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts). Kaufmann et al. (2001) 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (1999): The Deposit Insurance Scheme shows whether a country has a limited and explicit deposit insurance scheme or not, taking a value of 1 if it does, and a 
value of 0 otherwise. Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2000)   26 
APPENDIX 2: STYLIZED FACTS 
 
TABLE 1 
Main Statistics per Variable and per Country Group 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent
Financial development principal component 134 0.00 2.16 23 3.13 1.66 111 -0.65 1.62
Bank liabilities 134 50.60 34.60 23 70.77 23.94 111 46.43 35.07
Bank interest rate spreads (inverse) 134 0.21 0.21 23 0.37 0.21 111 0.17 0.19
Bank overhead costs (inverse) 99 34.86 24.37 23 42.88 20.72 76 32.01 24.47
Net interest margin (inverse) 96 31.26 17.75 23 48.05 19.34 73 26.43 14.03
Stock market turnover 82 0.45 0.46 23 0.67 0.37 59 0.37 0.46
Stock exchange listed companies 83 491.33 1153.41 21 1060.29 1780.66 62 298.61 774.31
Private credit 111 47.08 43.39 21 95.47 44.45 90 35.14 34.63
Stock market capitalization 83 58.11 73.43 21 114.73 72.99 62 38.93 63.44
Bonds oustanding 52 54.68 39.33 20 91.40 34.81 32 31.72 19.71
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 83 2.16 1.13 18 2.56 1.04 65 2.05 1.14
LOLR 61 1.10 0.51 18 1.00 0.34 43 1.14 0.56
Objectives 102 0.46 0.28 20 0.50 0.30 82 0.43 0.27
Regulation and supervision
Quality of regulation 122 5.16 1.69 22 6.41 1.53 100 4.88 1.60
Enforcement power  122 11.13 2.86 22 11.05 2.79 100 11.15 2.89
Independence of supervisors 82 2.44 1.12 22 2.65 1.28 60 2.36 1.05
Control variables
Institutional variables
Rule of law 45 6.99 2.63 21 9.26 1.05 24 5.00 1.84
Creditors' rights 43 2.30 1.39 21 1.95 1.07 22 2.64 1.59
Economic freedom index 103 5.48 1.90 23 7.44 1.16 80 4.92 1.68
Deposit Insurance Scheme 124 0.25 0.43 23 0.74 0.45 101 0.14 0.35
Financial system-related
Unbalanced financial structure 76 3.50 8.59 21 0.53 0.66 55 4.64 9.87
Foreign participation 67 20.34 21.96 18 0.10 0.20 49 0.24 0.22
Bank concentration 82 66.73 21.97 23 0.64 0.23 59 0.68 0.22
Prior banking crisis 134 0.47 0.50 23 0.26 0.45 111 0.51 0.50
Macro
GDP per capita 129 8323.06 7950.65 23 22146.08 4371.83 106 5323.73 4703.02
Domestic savings 114 17.28 11.96 17 23.87 5.38 97 16.13 12.43
Inflation 103 13.58 42.72 23 1.46 0.92 80 17.07 47.96
Economic policies
Fiscal deficit 91 -1.81 3.76 14 -1.53 2.79 77 -1.86 3.92
Exchange rate regime 117 1.89 0.91 21 2.10 0.94 96 1.84 0.90
Total sample Industrial countries Emerging countries
 
Note: This table reflects original data, including outliers.   27 
TABLE 2 






























Bank liabilities 0.71 1.00
Bank interest rate spreads (inverse) 0.67 0.41 1.00
Bank overhead costs (inverse) 0.57 0.43 0.33 1.00
Net interest margin (inverse) 0.64 0.39 0.37 0.57 1.00
Stock market turnover 0.56 0.41 0.45 0.32 0.28 1.00
Stock exchange listed companies 0.46 0.14 0.29 0.31 0.12 0.25 1.00
Private credit 0.87 0.83 0.55 0.41 0.47 0.42 0.34 1.00
Stock market capitalization 0.74 0.53 0.59 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.33 0.62 1.00
Bonds oustanding 0.62 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.47 0.42 0.50 1.00
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.19 0.10 0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.21 0.11 0.17 -0.08 -0.02
LOLR 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.01 -0.10 -0.19 -0.11 0.04 -0.14 -0.24
Objectives 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.13
Regulation and supervision
Quality of regulation 0.22 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.27 0.29 0.19 0.27
Enforcement power  0.01 0.02 0.18 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.24 -0.10
Independence of supervisors 0.08 -0.05 0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.10 -0.11
Control variables
Institutional variables
Rule of law 0.68 0.43 0.28 0.29 0.57 0.44 0.17 0.53 0.48 0.66
Creditors' rights 0.10 0.19 0.02 0.21 -0.15 -0.03 0.23 0.15 0.01 0.21
Economic freedom index 0.67 0.47 0.36 0.26 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.63 0.53 0.46
Deposit Insurance Scheme 0.37 0.13 0.24 0.03 0.30 0.06 0.29 0.31 0.21 0.43
Financial system-related
Unbalanced financial structure -0.30 -0.16 -0.29 -0.19 -0.14 -0.25 -0.13 -0.15 -0.29 -0.28
Foreign participation -0.21 -0.15 -0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.26 -0.13 -0.32 -0.28 -0.34
Bank concentration -0.24 0.04 -0.19 0.00 -0.04 -0.17 -0.21 -0.25 0.03 -0.07
Prior banking crisis -0.25 -0.34 -0.24 -0.13 -0.23 -0.08 0.01 -0.34 -0.19 -0.10
Macro
GDP per capita 0.83 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.08 -0.06 0.12 -0.09
Domestic savings 0.52 0.41 0.32 0.49 0.35 0.52 0.16 0.44 0.45 0.21
Inflation -0.26 -0.26 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23 -0.17 -0.11 -0.27 -0.27 -0.29
Economic policies
Fiscal deficit 0.20 0.10 0.18 0.33 0.27 0.25 -0.05 0.23 0.15 0.02












Involvement in payments system 1.00
LOLR -0.03 1.00
Objectives 0.08 0.22 1.00
Regulation and supervision
Quality of regulation 0.00 0.09 0.02 1.00
Enforcement power  0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 1.00
Independence of supervisors 0.00 -0.17 -0.16 -0.02 0.12 1.00
Control variables
Institutional variables
Rule of law 0.13 -0.06 0.16 0.23 -0.07 -0.01
Creditors' rights -0.24 -0.21 0.07 -0.13 -0.03 -0.30
Economic freedom index 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.28 0.04 -0.09
Deposit Insurance Scheme -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.30 0.05 -0.08
Financial system-related
Unbalanced financial structure -0.06 0.16 -0.22 0.02 0.03 -0.06
Foreign participation -0.23 -0.12 -0.10 -0.25 0.04 0.02
Bank concentration -0.06 -0.25 0.13 -0.23 -0.02 -0.23
Prior banking crisis 0.08 0.11 0.19 -0.03 -0.14 -0.07
Macro
GDP per capita -0.07 0.26 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.04
Domestic savings -0.06 -0.12 0.04 -0.04 -0.11 0.10
Inflation -0.17 0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.18 0.09
Economic policies
Fiscal deficit 0.27 0.16 0.07 0.10 -0.09 0.04
Exchange rate regime 0.18 -0.04 0.10 0.06 0.05 -0.16
Dependent variables
Objective variables
































Rule of law 1.00
Creditors' rights -0.03 1.00
Economic freedom index 0.75 0.09 1.00
Deposit Insurance Scheme 0.14 -0.21 0.35 1.00
Financial system-related
Unbalanced financial structure -0.12 0.04 -0.06 -0.08 1.00
Foreign participation -0.44 0.02 -0.21 -0.21 0.13 1.00
Bank concentration -0.02 0.04 -0.23 -0.16 0.05 0.20 1.00
Prior banking crisis -0.29 0.01 -0.31 -0.17 -0.06 0.04 -0.10 1.00
Macro
GDP per capita -0.11 0.08 0.00 0.19 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 1.00
Domestic savings 0.41 0.17 0.51 0.19 -0.21 -0.21 -0.15 -0.11 -0.05 1.00
Inflation -0.30 0.13 -0.24 -0.15 0.15 0.06 -0.13 0.02 0.06 0.00 1.00
Economic policies
Fiscal deficit 0.32 0.18 0.39 0.12 -0.03 -0.15 -0.23 -0.03 -0.09 0.34 -0.05 1.00
Exchange rate regime 0.31 0.01 0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.15 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 1.00
Control variables
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APPENDIX 3: DESCRIPTIVE GRAPHS 
Graph 1 
Financial Development Principal Component: Size and efficiency
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Graph 2 
Financial Development Principal Component: Size
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Graph 3 
Financial Development: Efficiency
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Graph 4 
Financial Development Principal Component: Banking sector
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Graph 5 
Bank Liabilities
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Graph 6 
Inverse of Bank Spreads







































































































































Note: Outliers have a barred line
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Graph 7 
Inverse of Bank Overhead Costs
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Note: Outliers have a barred line
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Graph 8 
Inverse of Net Interest Margin
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Note: Outliers have a barred line
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Graph 9 
Stock Market Turnover
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Note: Outliers have a barred line
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Graph 10 
Stock Exchange Listed Companies
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Note: Outliers have a barred line
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Graph 11 
Private Credit 
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Graph 12 
Stock Market Capitalization
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Note: Outliers have a barred line
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Graph 13 
Bonds Outstanding
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Graph 14 
Financial Development Principal Component: Small countries excluded from 
baseline







































































































































Countries excluded from the regression analysis
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APPENDIX 4: CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES 
 
Set 1: Central Bank Involvement in Payments System  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Best performers
Worst performers Worst performers


























































































Set 2: LOLR  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Best performers Best performers
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Set 3: Central Bank Objectives 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Best performers Best performers






























































































Set 4: Quality of Regulation 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Best performers
Worst performers Worst performers
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Set 5: Supervisory Enforcement 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Best performers Best performers
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APPENDIX 5: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS  
 
 

































Bank interest rate spreads (inverse) 0.414 1
Bank overhead costs (inverse) 0.478 0.401 1
Net interest margin (inverse) 0.459 0.465 0.659 1
Stock market turnover 0.340 0.540 0.324 0.413 1
Stock exchange listed companies 0.216 0.376 0.203 0.221 0.317 1
Private credit 0.699 0.557 0.543 0.605 0.478 0.470 1
Stock market capitalization 0.573 0.407 0.520 0.491 0.403 0.401 0.656 1
Bonds oustanding 0.311 0.404 0.376 0.490 0.452 0.494 0.580 0.498 1.000
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
1 4.664 3.614 0.518 0.518
2 1.050 0.276 0.117 0.635
3 0.774 0.086 0.086 0.721
4 0.688 0.167 0.077 0.797
5 0.521 0.091 0.058 0.855
6 0.430 0.068 0.048 0.903
7 0.363 0.060 0.040 0.943
8 0.303 0.096 0.034 0.977
9 0.207 . 0.023 1
Eigenvectors Component
(Scoring coefficients) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Bank liabilities 0.33 -0.34 -0.23 -0.56 -0.09 -0.25 0.27 0.16 0.48
Bank interest rate spreads (inverse) 0.33 0.15 0.48 -0.26 0.54 -0.18 -0.49 0.08 0.07
Bank overhead costs (inverse) 0.33 -0.43 0.02 0.39 0.28 0.40 0.13 0.55 -0.07
Net interest margin (inverse) 0.35 -0.30 0.18 0.45 0.08 -0.21 0.16 -0.67 0.20
Stock market turnover 0.30 0.25 0.61 -0.17 -0.47 0.35 0.33 0.01 -0.01
Stock exchange listed companies 0.25 0.63 -0.38 0.04 0.42 0.22 0.36 -0.11 0.17
Private credit 0.41 -0.04 -0.18 -0.18 -0.01 -0.28 0.15 -0.06 -0.81
Stock market capitalization 0.36 -0.07 -0.35 -0.11 -0.26 0.50 -0.58 -0.27 0.03
Bonds oustanding 0.33 0.34 -0.11 0.43 -0.40 -0.45 -0.22 0.37 0.17
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APPENDIX 6: 
 
ADDITIONAL EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Number of obs
F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Financial development principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.3162 (1.62) 0.3720 (0.90) 0.4638 ** (2.00)
LOLR 0.3818 (0.78) 3.5770 ** (4.87) 0.0412 (0.08)
Objectives 1.0347 * (1.74) 2.6973 ** (2.16) 1.0304 (1.30)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system and 
LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.156 0.003 ** 0.224
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.1235 (-1.21) 0.2133 (1.12) -0.1702 (-1.44)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0370 (0.64) 0.0826 (0.71) 0.0082 (0.13)
Independence of Supervisors -0.1841 (-0.98) 0.1950 (1.12) -0.3973 (-1.62)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement power 
and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.483 0.245 0.119
Control variables
GDP per capita 1.7758 ** (10.37) 0.9066 (1.31) 2.0251 ** (6.11)




Table 1. Robustness test for supervisory independence with different data set 
(1)
All countries Industrial countries Emerging countries
 







Financial development principal component Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.7308 (0.97)
LOLR 0.4630 ** (2.20)
Objectives -0.2674 (-0.76)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system and LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.188
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.1606 (-1.55)
Supervisory Enforcement  -0.0086 (-0.13)
Independence of Supervisors 0.4260 ** (3.56)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement power and 
supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.003 **
Control variables
GDP per capita 1.0547 ** (2.75)
constant 0.0662 (0.08)
53.88%






            (2) Kaufman et al (2001)   48 
Number of obs
F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Financial development principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system -0.0934 (-0.83) 0.2371 ** (2.66) -0.1481 (-1.25)
LOLR 0.2945 * (1.82) 0.2669 (0.76) 0.3884 ** (2.48)
Objectives -0.1700 (-0.55) 0.4508 (1.34) -0.3528 (-0.87)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system 
and LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.279 0.110 0.037 **
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation 0.0301 (0.63) 0.0937 * (1.82) -0.0590 (-1.29)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0264 (1.12) 0.0869 ** (2.78) 0.0196 (0.67)
Independence of Supervisors 0.1287 (1.57) 0.0577 (0.88) 0.0979 (1.02)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement 
power and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.314 0.026 ** 0.436
Control variables
Financial development  in 1997 0.9983 ** (31.79) 1.1482 ** (8.80) 0.9232 ** (16.74)








Table 3. Robustness test for endogeneity of financial development







F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Financial development principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.3339 * (1.86) 0.1729 (0.44) 0.4481 ** (2.24)
LOLR 0.4270 (0.90) 3.7090 ** (5.80) 0.0304 (0.06)
Objectives 0.8945 (1.51) 2.5483 ** (2.01) 0.8745 (1.11)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system 
and LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.106 0.001 ** 0.161
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.1396 (-1.41) 0.2808 (1.04) -0.1399 (-1.18)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0495 (0.86) 0.0653 (0.57) 0.0278 (0.44)
Independence of Supervisors -0.2420 (-1.38) 0.3533 (1.50) -0.4852 * (-1.86)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement 
power and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.320 0.334 0.098 *
Control variables
Location of regulation and supervision 0.5204 (1.63) 0.1714 (0.23) 0.1829 (0.43)
GDP per capita 1.8708 ** (11.24) 1.0376 (1.29) 2.0265 ** (5.97)




Table 4. Inclusion of location of regulation and supervision as additional regressor
All countries Industrial countries Emerging countries
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Number of obs
F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Financial development as size principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.2236 (1.39) -0.1527 (-0.53) 0.3982 ** (2.29)
LOLR 0.2739 (0.66) 2.6949 ** (5.19) 0.0486 (0.10)
Objectives 0.8233 (1.59) 2.0255 ** (2.69) 0.7139 (1.17)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system 
and LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.210 0.001 ** 0.129
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.0269 (-0.35) 0.4357 ** (3.07) -0.0516 (-0.57)
Supervisory Enforcement  -0.0075 (-0.19) -0.0697 (-0.87) -0.0207 (-0.46)
Independence of Supervisors -0.2679 ** (-1.97) 0.1468 (1.03) -0.3981 * (-1.90)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement 
power and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.250 0.037 ** 0.133
Control variables
GDP per capita 1.2854 ** (7.80) 0.7504 (1.58) 1.5951 ** (4.16)
constant -0.0488 (-0.07) -4.9372 ** (-4.77) 0.5866 (0.71)
Table 5. Robustness test for financial size as dependent variable














F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Financial development as efficiency principal 
component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.2579 (1.63) 0.3794 (1.06) 0.2588 (1.53)
LOLR 0.2335 (0.73) 2.4323 ** (6.06) -0.0369 (-0.11)
Objectives 0.6528 (1.52) 1.7137 * (1.66) 0.6014 (1.07)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system 
and LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.135 0.000 ** 0.341
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.1548 * (-1.68) -0.0163 (-0.09) -0.1466 (-1.55)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0612 (0.97) 0.1764 * (1.74) 0.0543 (0.70)
Independence of Supervisors -0.0211 (-0.13) 0.3918 ** (2.07) -0.2774 (-1.27)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement 
power and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.424 0.042 ** 0.138
Control variables
GDP per capita 1.2410 ** (8.46) 0.4911 (0.88) 1.2866 ** (3.45)
constant -0.7892 (-1.00) -5.8943 ** (-3.32) 0.2143 (0.26)
Table 6. Robustness test for financial efficiency as dependent variable
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Number of obs
F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Bank development principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.2450 (1.34) 0.0711 (0.24) 0.4270 ** (2.31)
LOLR 0.4517 (0.87) 3.8061 ** (8.34) -0.0194 (-0.04)
Objectives 0.5980 (0.94) 2.0797 ** (2.38) 0.5440 (0.68)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system 
and LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.369 0.000 ** 0.149
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.1519 (-1.62) 0.0765 (0.40) -0.1123 (-1.02)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0399 (0.68) 0.1695 * (1.76) 0.0140 (0.22)
Independence of Supervisors -0.2015 (-1.03) 0.3304 * (1.77) -0.4577 * (-1.68)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement 
power and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.318 0.171 0.090 *
Control variables
GDP per capita 1.2756 ** (7.26) 0.0422 (0.05) 1.5906 ** (5.19)
constant -0.2877 (-0.27) -6.4390 ** (-2.71) 0.7012 (0.70)
Table 7. Robustness test for bank development as dependent variable










F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Private credit to GDP Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.1602 (1.50) 0.0720 (0.44) 0.3034 ** (3.02)
LOLR 0.1747 (0.55) 2.6571 ** (8.88) -0.1249 (-0.43)
Objectives 0.3531 (0.91) 1.6166 ** (4.02) 0.3664 (1.06)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system and 
LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.343 0.000 ** 0.036 **
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation 0.0222 (0.45) 0.3177 ** (3.81) 0.0028 (0.05)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0108 (0.31) 0.1198 ** (2.13) -0.0241 (-0.69)
Independence of Supervisors -0.1207 (-1.05) 0.2345 ** (2.31) -0.2380 * (-1.71)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement power 
and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.675 0.000 ** 0.146
Control variables
GDP per capita 0.6389 ** (5.88) -0.3674 (-1.07) 0.8130 ** (5.47)
constant -0.6025 (-1.00) -6.0120 ** (-7.24) 0.2399 (0.47)
Table 8. Robustness test for credit to the private sector as dependent variable
0.000 0.000 0.000
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Number of obs
F-test (p-value) ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust
Private credit to GDP Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.1467 (1.39) 0.3518 ** (3.15)
LOLR 0.1988 (0.61) -0.0820 (-0.29)
Objectives 0.6031 (1.53) 0.7883 ** (2.14)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system and 
LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.192 0.017 **
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation 0.0592 (1.17) 0.0387 (0.96)
Supervisory Enforcement  -0.0017 (-0.05) -0.0302 (-0.89)
Independence of Supervisors -0.0357 (-0.29) -0.1384 (-1.03)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement power 
and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.679 0.378
Control variables
Institutional
Rule of law -0.0717 (-1.21) -0.0631 (-0.83)
Creditors' rights 0.1728 ** (2.05) 0.3130 ** (3.50)
Economic freedom index 0.1148 * (1.90) 0.0954 (1.57)
Deposit Insurance Scheme -0.1872 (-0.96) 0.0045 (0.01)
Joint test for  institutional variables
F-test (p-value) 0.018 ** 0.003 **
Financial system-related
Unbalanced financial structure 0.0019 (0.32) 0.0033 (0.49)
Foreign participation -0.3281 (-0.51) -0.2109 (-0.27)
Bank concentration -0.0102 * (-1.81) -0.0095 (-1.27)
Financial crisis after liberalization -0.4476 ** (-2.13) -0.6066 ** (-2.69)
Joint test for financial system related variables
F-test (p-value) 0.080 * 0.066 *
Macroeconomic
GDP per capita 0.4687 ** (2.94) 0.6126 ** (3.62)
Domestic savings 0.0077 (0.67) -0.0006 (-0.05)
Inflation -3.1978 ** (-3.43) -2.2534 ** (-2.64)
Joint test for macroeconomic variables
F-test (p-value) 0.000 ** 0.000 **
Economic policies
Fiscal deficit -0.0095 (-0.41) -0.0142 (-0.62)
Exchange rate regime -0.0996 (-0.66) -0.0790 (-0.53)
Joint test for economic policy variables
F-test (p-value) 0.658 0.672
constant -0.4189 (-0.37) -0.2663 (-0.21)
0.000
Table 9. Robustness test: credit to the private sector as dependent variable, including all control variables
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Number of obs
F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Financial development principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.4041 ** (2.13) 0.5718 * (1.73) 0.4663 ** (2.30)
LOLR 0.5024 (0.86) 4.9418 ** (8.96) -0.0177 (-0.03)
Objectives 0.9686 (1.63) 1.9723 * (1.69) 1.3339 * (1.73)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system and 
LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.063 * 0.000 ** 0.084 *
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.1206 (-1.22) 0.1928 (0.94) -0.1395 (-1.14)
Supervisory Enforcement  0.0000 (0.00) 0.1021 (0.75) -0.0291 (-0.47)
Independence of Supervisors -0.2675 (-1.19) 0.1331 (0.51) -0.4661 (-1.53)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement power 
and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.339 0.588 0.074 *
Control variables
GDP per capita 1.7785 ** (9.49) 0.0251 (0.03) 1.8061 ** (6.06)
constant -0.2893 (-0.27) -7.0551 ** (-2.75) 0.8817 (0.82)
Table 10. Robustness test controlling for outliers in the definition of financial development
0.000 0.000 0.000











F-test (p-value) ** ** **
R-squared
Dependent Robust Robust Robust
Financial development principal component Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test Coefficient t-test
Objective variables
Central bank
Involvement in payments system 0.1872 (1.20) 0.0785 (0.27) 0.3171 * (1.86)
LOLR 0.3712 (1.01) 3.1048 ** (7.28) -0.0646 (-0.19)
Objectives 0.6006 (1.50) 2.2776 ** (2.61) 0.4676 (1.03)
Joint test for CB Objectives, payment system and 
LOLR
F-test (p-value) 0.120 0.000 ** 0.246
Regulation and supervision
Quality of Regulation -0.0680 (-1.05) 0.2306 (1.45) -0.0903 (-1.39)
Supervisory Enforcement  -0.0049 (-0.13) 0.0986 (1.27) -0.0057 (-0.15)
Independence of Supervisors -0.0268 (-0.17) 0.3925 ** (2.21) -0.1872 (-0.93)
Joint test for quality regulation, enforcement power 
and supervisory independence
F-test (p-value) 0.739 0.041 ** 0.359
Control variables
GDP per capita 1.8126 ** (14.57) 1.3751 ** (2.74) 1.8940 ** (7.90)




Table 11. Robustness test including small countries
0.000 0.000 0.000
Industrial countries Emerging countries
23 111 134
 
 
 